Episode 270

24th July – 26th July 2026

Sanctions

UK Government Updates Russia Sanctions List with Variations and Corrections for Three Individuals

The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has updated the UK Sanctions List under the Russia regime, implementing two administrative variations and one correction. The variations apply to Pavel Ezubov, designated due to his association with Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and Vasily Vitalyevich Abramov, the chief executive of Kazstanex LLP, which is accused of making available economic resources and technology which could destabilise Ukraine. Both individuals remain subject to an asset freeze, travel ban, trust services sanctions, and director disqualifications. Additionally, the government published a correction for Daria Rosliakova, the Regional Analysis Department Head of Rybar LLC, who remains subject to multiple measures, including specialised internet services sanctions which require social media platforms and application stores to block UK access to her content.

US Treasury Sanctions Key Individuals and Entities in Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas Financial Networks

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced sanctions against Mahmoud al-Abyari, a United Kingdom-based senior leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, alongside three other individuals and three entities accused of providing material and financial support to Hamas. Among those targeted under Executive Order 13224 are two self-described humanitarian organisations, Indonesia-based Tujah Bulah Global and Gaza-based Madad Palestine Charitable Society, which OFAC alleges functioned as front organisations to funnel funds to Hamas's military wing. The designations also target Türkiye-based currency exchange El-Kahira for General Trading, its owner Khuldun Khamis Zakaria Alden, and shareholders Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jebouri and Abdullah Issam Ahmad Al-Jebouri, for allegedly facilitating hundreds of thousands of dollars in transfers for Hamas and providing underground banking services. As a result of these actions, all US-based assets of the designated parties are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions involving their property or interests in property.

EU Mobilises Massive 21st Sanctions Package Targeting Russian Energy and Global Crypto Networks

The European Union has adopted its 21st sanctions package against Russia, representing the most extensive batch of individual listings since 2022 with 218 new targets. While Brussels aims to further squeeze the Kremlin's economic resources, the sheer breadth of this latest round, reaching deep into third-country banks and maritime crewing agencies, points to a recognition that earlier, simpler barriers are no longer holding. Rather than a decisive blow, the measures appear to reflect a gruelling, block-by-block enforcement effort which is likely to test the limits of Western diplomatic reach.

A major focus of the new package is the rapidly shifting world of digital finance. In a significant escalation, the EU has extended its transaction ban to 14 cryptocurrency platforms scattered across jurisdictions such as Panama and the United Arab Emirates. More notably, the bloc has introduced a new mechanism allowing for a total third-country ban on crypto services if those nations continue to host platforms facilitating evasion. This move may suggest that European officials are growing deeply concerned about the flight of capital into decentralised digital assets. However, enforcing such a ban across sovereign borders outside the EU's direct jurisdiction is likely to prove legally and politically fraught, potentially straining relations with neutral trading partners.

Energy markets also forced some pragmatism in the negotiations. The EU agreed to pause the automatic downward adjustment of its Russian oil price cap until July 2027, an acknowledgment of the market instability triggered by the recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz. To prevent leakages, the Council blacklisted an additional 41 shadow-fleet tankers and, in a first-of-its-kind move, designated a maritime crewing agency supplying personnel to these sanctions-evading vessels. Refineries were not spared either; a Georgian refinery in Kulevi faces a transaction ban slated to take effect in six months, showing a willingness to disrupt processing facilities outside of Russia itself.

The package also targets the physical supply chains keeping the Russian military active. Export bans have been expanded to cover niche technical items like beryllium powders used in missile propellants and specialised self-adhesive films used in aerospace engineering. Yet, the inclusion of 51 new entities from third countries, which include China, India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, underlines the persistent reality of circumvention. While the EU hopes these restrictions will choke off the flow of microelectronics and drone components, critics might argue that as long as lucrative arbitrage opportunities exist, new front companies are likely to simply emerge to replace those blacklisted today.

Other Financial Crime

Systemic Tensions and Tech Gaps Hamper UK's Response to Economic Crime, Study Suggests

A new study by researchers at the University of Manchester suggests that the UK's response to economic crime is being severely constrained by deep structural friction and outdated digital infrastructure. Published in the Journal of Economic Criminology, the research analyses the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), a hub established in 2018 to coordinate a unified response across public and private sectors. While the NECC was designed to act as a central broker connecting disparate law enforcement bodies, the study’s authors argue that many of the hurdles it faces are not simply operational glitches but are instead permanent systemic tensions which must be constantly managed rather than easily solved.

One major issue appears to be the conceptual blurriness of the term "economic crime" itself. By grouping highly distinct offences, such as complex international money laundering and localised courier fraud, under a single political umbrella, the system may inadvertently produce generic strategies which fail to target the specific drivers of different crimes. This "conceptual disorder" is likely exacerbated by a severe data vacuum, with the National Crime Agency estimating that approximately 86% of fraud cases go unreported. Operational priorities are also highly susceptible to sudden geopolitical shifts; for instance, long-stalled reforms regarding beneficial ownership and Companies House registry rules only gained legislative traction within weeks of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Furthermore, the day-to-day work of investigators is frequently slowed by technological limitations which seem out of step with a modern financial system. Interviewed officials revealed that staff lack access to basic collaborative platforms like Slack or Teams, while a lack of real-time data analysis tools means that collecting crucial information for international cases can drag on for months rather than being resolved in a week. To make matters more difficult, the NECC's multi-agency identity is constantly threatened by resource constraints. When partner agencies face budget cuts, they frequently pull their seconded personnel to focus on their own core mandates. This has led to a situation where roughly 75% of the centre's staff are drawn directly from the National Crime Agency, risking an NCA-centric culture which may alienate other partners.

This lack of formal power appears to fuel friction between agencies, particularly when roles overlap. The study highlights a delicate relationship between the NECC and the City of London Police, the national lead force for fraud. Because the NECC has no statutory authority to mandate actions, it relies heavily on personal relationships and voluntary cooperation. This leaves the system vulnerable to delays and staff turnover; a single uncooperative official can easily stall joint initiatives, such as recent campaigns targeting money mules. While some observers advocate for a more independent centre with direct enforcement powers, the study notes that granting the NECC top-down authority risks alienating partners who prize their institutional autonomy. Finding a middle ground, perhaps by granting the NECC a distinct legal status while remaining hosted by the NCA, may suggest a realistic path forward. The article is open access and can be accessed via the press release.